PROBATION DOESN'T AUTOMATICALLY CONTINUE THE TOLLING PERIOD AFTER BEING ADJUDICATED

The time between the violation of probation and adjudicating on the violation does not automatically get added to the end of probation.

Gonzalez-Ramos v. State, 46 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010):

Shenfeld v. State, 14 So.3d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 4th DCA) ("It is axiomatic that `[o]nce a term of probation has expired, a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application for revocation of probation based upon a violation which occurred during the probation period unless, during the term of probation, appropriate steps were taken to revoke or modify probation.'") (quoting Clark v. State, 402 So.2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)), review granted, 29 So.3d 292 (Fla.2009); 69*69 Jones v. State, 964 So.2d 167, 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ("Once a term of probation expires, a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application for a revocation of probation based upon a violation that occurred during the probation period unless, during the term of probation, appropriate steps were taken to revoke or modify probation."); see also § 948.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) ("Upon the termination of the period of probation, the probationer shall be released from probation and is not liable to sentence for the offense for which probation was allowed.")…

We do not believe that the provisions of section 948.06 or the cases applying the tolling provisions of that statute lend support for the interpretation advanced by the State that each and every violation period (the time between the issuance of the warrant and adjudication of the violation allegations) prior to the expiration date of the probation term should be applied to the end of the originally imposed term to automatically extend the term by the total of the violation periods when each violation resulted in a continuation of the original term of probation. Here, Defendant violated his probation twice during the original term of his probation. The trial court could have appropriately extended Defendant's term of probation each time he was found in violation. See, e.g., Eddie v. State, 933 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding that probation may be enhanced, either by extension of the period or by addition of terms). However, the court did not avail itself of that option; instead, it simply continued the originally imposed term of probation that would expire on July 14, 2007. In Vidaurre v. State, 8 So.3d 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), for example, the defendant was placed on a five-year term of probation for the offense of possession of cocaine and violated his probation four times. Each time, the court continued the defendant's probation. After the expiration of that five-year term of probation, the defendant was charged with a fifth violation and was subsequently adjudicated in violation. In holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the violation, the court explained:

"A violation of probation must be set in motion prior to the termination of the period of probation." Jones v. State, 954 So.2d 675, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); see also § 948.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2001); State v. Wimberly, 574 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ("A trial court lacks jurisdiction to revoke probation for violations which occur during the period of probation unless the revocation process is set in motion during the probationary period."). Here, in light of his scoresheet, Mr. Vidaurre's probationary term could have been longer than five years, but it ended in June 2006 because the trial court continued his probationary term instead of extending it. Since the next violation of probation was not set in motion before the period of probation ended, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to find Mr. Vidaurre in violation of his probation on September 28, 2007.

Vidaurre, 8 So.3d at 1207.