[T]he State was required to prove he resisted the specific officers named in the information charging him with the crime. See, e.g., Carlson v. State, 166 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). However, our review of the record establishes that the State did prove Mesamours resisted Detectives Dordor and Russel because he accelerated in an attempt to avoid police after the officers activated their emergency lights. See C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2009) (flight in knowing defiance of an officer’s lawful order to stop constitutes offense of resisting without violence).

In Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996), the Florida Supreme Court set forth guidelines for trial courts in ruling upon a race-based objection to a peremptory challenge.3 First, a party objecting to the use of a peremptory challenge must demonstrate the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group and request a reason for the strike. Id. at 764. Next, the proponent of the strike must give a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. Finally, if the reason given is facially race-neutral, “and the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained.” Id. (emphasis added). The court should focus on the genuineness of the strike proponent’s explanation and “the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added).

“A trial court’s decision to allow a peremptory strike of a juror is based primarily on an assessment of credibility.” Poole, 151 So. 3d at 409 (citing King v. State, 89 So. 3d 209, 229 (Fla. 2012)). On review, we “must ‘acknowledge that peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner,’” id. (emphasis added) (quoting Nowell v. State, 998 So. 2d 597, 602 (Fla. 2008)). Of significance, “[a]s the trial court is generally in the best position to assess the genuineness of the reason advanced, the decision will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. (emphasis added).

“[i]n making a genuineness determination, the Court should consider all relevant circumstances surrounding the strike,” presuming that the strike is not discriminatory. Poole, 151 So. 3d at 409-10. This important precept distinguishes this case from our prior precedent in Overstreet v. State, 712 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) and Randall v. State, 718 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

[T]he State commendably concedes error. We agree that Counts I and II plainly fail the Blockburger test. Simple possession is subsumed by possession with intent to distribute; the former does not have any element that the latter does not. See Sims v. State, 793 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Convictions for possession with intent to sell [drugs] and simple possession of the same [drugs] violate a defendant’s double jeopardy rights.”) (citation omitted).

After the defendant makes a prima facie showing that a peremptory strike was based on race (step one), the prosecutor must provide a race-neutral reason for the challenged strike (step two). Then, at step three, defense counsel has an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason as pretextual, and the trial court in turn decides whether the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for striking a juror is pretextual “in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 252 (2005); see Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 301–303 (2019); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472, 478–479 (2008). In this capital case, the Mississippi trial court never conducted the essential third step of the Batson inquiry… by concluding that Pitchford had waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons as pretextual at Batson’s third step.

After a prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, the defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual. In this case, whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred…

A defendant may establish deficient performance where counsel’s misadvice leads the defendant to reject a favorable plea. Steel v. State, 684 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Counsel has a duty to provide reasonably accurate advice regarding both the strength of the state’s case and the defendant’s potential sentencing exposure. See Cobb v. State, 394 So. 3d 1195, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“Generally, defense counsel is obligated to advise the defendant of all pertinent matters bearing on the choice of which plea to enter, including the strength of the case brought by the State against the defendant.”); Louima v. State, 247 So. 3d 564, 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (noting that “[a]n ineffective assistance claim is sufficient where the attorney failed to advise the defendant of the maximum penalty that he or she faces”).

[T]he defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the plea would have been entered and accepted. Frye, 566 U.S. at 148. This determination is made through an objective assessment of the circumstances at the time of the plea offer. Key v. State, 357 So. 3d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

As to the first Alcorn factor, Inostroza testified that he would have accepted the plea offer had he been properly advised regarding his sentencing exposure and the risks of proceeding to trial. The trial court did not reject this testimony as not credible, and the record does not refute this testimony. Given the substantial disparity between the plea offer and the possible maximum sentence, the evidence supports a reasonable probability that Inostroza would have accepted the offer.

Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978) (explaining a VOP affidavit need only allege the basic facts and “need not be set forth with the specificity required in criminal indictments and informations”). More importantly, the same VOP affidavit also relied on Reddick’s nine violations of the standard condition of living without violating the law, as to which Reddick clearly received full due process. His final argument about costs of prosecution fails under current law. See Parks v. State, 411 So. 3d 414 (Fla. 2025).

Sapp v. State, 372 So. 3d 768, 770–71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“[A] defendant alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to . . . preserve a claim of reversible error . . . must demonstrate prejudice at the trial, not on appeal.” (quoting Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 323 (Fla. 2007))). Rather, “[u]nder Hill [v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)], a movant alleging ineffective assistance must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Id. at 770 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).

“It is elemental in our system of jurisprudence that the jury is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses. Thus, it is an invasion of the jury’s exclusive province for one witness to offer his personal view on the credibility of a fellow witness.” Davis v. State, 360 So. 3d 809, 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (quoting Sierra v. State, 230 So. 3d 48, 51-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)). “This principle applies equally in cases where the testimony offered directly comments on the truthfulness of a minor victim.” Smith v. State, 292 So. 3d 46, 48-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (collecting cases). Indeed, where a case turns on the credibility of the victim—a common occurrence in molestation cases like this one— improper bolstering can be particularly harmful. See Johnson v. State, 177 So. 3d 1005, 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (”Improper bolstering of a witness is especially troubling in a case that rests solely on competing witness accounts to establish an element of the crime.”); see also Cavaliere v. State, 147 So. 3d 628, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (”Because the primary evidence against Cavaliere was the victim’s testimony, we cannot say that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.”).

“[W]hen a police officer, who is generally regarded by the jury as disinterested and objective and therefore highly credible, is the corroborating witness, the danger of improperly influencing the jury becomes particularly grave.” Davis, 360 So. 3d at 814 (quoting Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074, 1080 (Fla. 2000)). “Thus, ‘[w]here a police officer’s testimony is used to bolster the credibility of a victim, the error cannot be deemed harmless.’ “ Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sierra, 230 So. 3d at 52); see also Cavaliere, 147 So. 3d at 629 (”[E]rrors committed from the improper admission of a police officer’s testimony that can be used to bolster the credibility of a victim’s trial testimony cannot be deemed harmless.” (quoting Lee v. State, 873 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004))).

Civilians are also prohibited from vouching for the victim’s credibility. “Although the prohibitions on civilians vouching for a victim’s credibility have not been treated as harshly by the courts, such testimony can still be harmful error.” Cavaliere, 147 So. 3d at 629 (citing Rhue v. State, 693 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).

In addition, the “fellow officer rule,” or the “collective knowledge doctrine,” in Florida allows a state police officer to rely on information from federal agents to establish probable cause. State v. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 2012). “The primary purpose of the rule is ‘to assist officers investigating in the field to make arrests and conduct searches’ because ‘an officer in the field may need to act immediately based on upon what he or she is told by a fellow officer.’” Montes-Valeton v. State, 216 So. 3d 475, 478 (Fla. 2017) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

“As a practical matter, absence of a search warrant in the court file sufficed to shift the burden of going forward to the prosecution.”

State v. Vanderhors, 927 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Importantly, in determining the legality of the warrant, consideration of testimony taken at the hearing on the motion to suppress which does not appear in the affidavit in support of the search warrant is improper. Montgomery v. State, 584 So. 2d 65, 66 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Courts must base their probable cause determination solely on what was presented to the issuing magistrate in the affidavit, thus confining their review to a consideration of the four corners of the probable cause affidavit. See Id. at 66-67; Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1180.

NOTE

In this case the FBI had a warrant, but they refused to release the affidavit to the State agency.

The Supreme Court in Erlinger expressly recognized that a court can “undertake the job of finding the fact of a prior conviction—and that job alone.” 602 U.S. at 835–38. Under Florida law, Appellant is a VFOSC if he was on “[f]elony probation . . . related to the commission of a qualifying offense.” § 948.06(8)(b)1., Fla. Stat. Erlinger does not require a jury to find the fact of Appellant’s prior conviction for purposes of the VFOSC designation. See Maye v. State, 368 So. 3d 531, 532 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (“[T]he date a defendant was released from prison or jail and the nature of the qualifying offense are ministerial in nature and thus do not require jury findings.”), review granted, No. SC20231184, 2024 WL 1796831 (oral argument held February 6, 2025).

…

In two of Appellant’s three consolidated cases, the judicial “danger to the community” fact-finding occurred in probation revocation proceedings, in which there appears to be no Sixth Amendment concern regardless of the impact on Appellant’s sentence. See Hollingsworth v. State, 293 So. 3d 1049, 1052–53 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); Souza v. State, 229 So. 3d 387, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

However, case number 2023-CF-970 involved new criminal charges. If the trial court, rather than a jury, had found Appellant a “danger to the community” and increased Appellant’s sentence, it would violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See Brown v. State, 260 So. 3d 147, 149 (Fla. 2018). In Brown, the trial court was required to determine, under section 775.082(10) of the Florida Statutes, whether sentencing a defendant to a “nonstate prison sanction” rather than a prison sentence “could present a danger to the public.” The court made the public-danger determination without a jury. Id. at 150. The supreme court held that this violated the defendant’s SixthAmendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 150–51.

Given the clear mandate of Apprendi, Alleyne, and particularly Erlinger, Florida’s Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act is unconstitutional on its face and, consequently, as applied to Maye. It is for this reason that Maye properly sought relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800.

…

Florida’s Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act was in effect in 2002 when Maye was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and, inconceivably, it remains unchanged in 2026. In the two decades following the Apprendi decision, the Florida Legislature has not conformed the statute to constitutional standards, and the trial courts around the state continue to regularly sentence defendants pursuant to it. This Court, rather than addressing the threshold question of the statute’s constitutionality, chooses to sidestep it.

The list of statutory departure reasons provided in section 921.0026(2) is not exclusive. State v. Randall, 746 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Therefore, the trial court may impose a downward departure for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026, so long as the reason given is supported by competent, substantial evidence and not otherwise prohibited. State v. Laroe, 821 So.2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); State v. Barnes, 753 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Here, the trial court gave three reasons for downward departure: Mr. Stephenson's remorse, his family support obligations, and the fact that he had "kept his nose clean" since being released from prison in 2004.

“If the motion for continuance concerns the absence of a witness, ‘the defendant must show: (1) prior due diligence to obtain the witness’s presence; (2) substantially favorable testimony would have been forthcoming; (3) the witness was available and willing to testify; and (4) the denial of the continuance caused material prejudice.’” Smith v. State, 170 So. 3d 745, 758–59 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510, 525 (Fla. 2009)). We review rulings on such motions for an abuse of discretion. Middleton v. State, 220 So. 3d 1152, 1175 (Fla. 2017).

Relying on Reynolds v. State, 74 So. 3d 541, 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), Appellant asserts that testimony of general criminal behavior, i.e., how sandwich bags are used by other dealers, offered by Officer Santos, is inadmissible as substantive proof of Appellant’s guilt. More than twenty (20) years ago, the First District set forth the law that has been consistently applied for decades:

the law is well settled that general criminal behavior testimony based upon a law enforcement officer’s observations and experience in the investigation of other cases is inadmissible as substantive proof of a defendant’s guilt, because a defendant has a right to be tried based on the evidence against him or her, not on the characteristics or general behavior of certain classes of criminals in general.

Baskin v. State, 732 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The Fourth District gave an enlightening discussion of why such testimony is typically inadmissible and then discussed several specific cases in which “common drug dealer practice” testimony was found to be reversible error. Armalin v. State, 884 So. 2d 458, 459–60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Santos’ baggie testimony fits that category of inadmissible “common drug dealer practice” evidence.

“No magic words are needed to make a proper objection,” as long as the contemporaneous objection is sufficient to “inform the court of the alleged error.” State v. Paulk, 813 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (citing Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1982)). While the relevance and section 90.403-based objections might deserve a higher grade on a law school exam, we find Appellant’s “speculation” objection to have sufficiently alerted the trial court to the issue.

Appellee provided no evidence at the sentencing hearing establishing the federal victims’ need for restitution. Appellee failed to prove this ground by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (“The level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence.”); Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 1999) (“[F]acts supporting the ground [for departure] must be proved at trial by a preponderance of the evidence.” (internal quotations omitted)).

Second, in order to properly apply the statutory ground listed in section 921.0026(2)(j), a court must find that the defendant has shown remorse, an element included in the plain language of the statute. See State v. Brannum, 876 So. 2d 724, 726–27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (finding that this ground for departure was not established by competent substantial evidence where the trial court failed to find that the defendant was remorseful for his wrongful conduct); State v. Thompson, 844 So. 2d 814, 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (finding that departure under section 921.0026(2)(j) was improper where the trial court only made a finding as to the “unsophisticated manner” element and not the other two elements of “isolated incident” and “remorse”).

At the hearing on his motion to withdraw plea, Williams testified that he would not have entered the plea but for the misadvice of counsel. He provided uncontroverted testimony that his trial counsel had advised him to take the plea and that he could later appeal the sentence and “be out.”1

Williams established that the affirmative misadvice of counsel misled him into accepting a fifteen-year plea offer, rendering his plea involuntary. See State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1044 (Fla. 2003) (holding that “to obtain relief through a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing under rule 3.170(l), a defendant must demonstrate a manifest injustice, such as involuntariness of the plea”); see also Davis v. State, 373 So. 3d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (holding attorney’s misadvice about gain time eligibility could render plea involuntary); Walkup v. State, 822 So.2d 524, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (observing that, generally, affirmative misadvice of counsel provides basis to allow withdrawal of plea). Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Williams’s motion to withdraw his plea and remand for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTE

1: In fact, however, Williams had no right to appeal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)

Like the right to appeal, criminal defendants also enjoy the right to counsel on direct appeal under both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as article I, section 16(a) of the Florida Constitution. And of course, a criminal defendant may also represent himself. See Pasha v. State, 39 So. 3d 1259, 1261 (Fla. 2010) (“[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments include a ‘constitutional right to proceed without counsel when’ a criminal defendant ‘voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.’” (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008))). But a defendant has no right to do both at the same time. As the Florida Supreme Court put it:

More than twenty years ago, this Court explained that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), does not “guarantee that the accused can make his own defense personally and have the assistance of counsel.” State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338, 33940 (Fla.1980). Likewise, article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution does not “embody a right of one accused of crime to representation both by counsel and by himself.” Id. at 340; see also Mora v. State, 814 So. 2d 322, 328 (Fla.) (“[T]here is no constitutional right for hybrid representation at trial.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1050, 123 S.Ct. 603, 154 L.Ed.2d 526 (2002). Thus, as the Fifth District Court of Appeal succinctly stated in Sheppard v. State, 391 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), shortly after this Court decided Tait, “[t]he defendant, under appropriate circumstances, has the constitutional right to waive counsel and represent himself. The defendant has no right, however, to partially represent himself and, at the same time, be partially represented by counsel.” Id. at 347 (citations omitted).

Logan, 846 So. 2d at 474–75 (footnote omitted).

We made clear that though we were reversing and remanding on this ground, Owens was not necessarily entitled to a new trial, noting that not every comment made by a prosecutor during voir dire concerning a defendant’s right to remain silent was always inappropriate. Id. at 876 n.5 (citing Grieve v. State, 731 So. 2d 84, 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

Florida has “adopted a very liberal rule for determining whether a comment constitutes a comment on silence.” Marston v. State, 136 So. 3d 563, 569 (Fla. 2014) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)). To that end, “[a]ny comment on, or which is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant’s failure to testify is error and is strongly discouraged.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 (Fla. 2000)).

See Cox v. State, 966 So. 2d 337, 347 (Fla. 2007). The court held:

The harmless error test as articulated, by this Court requires the State “as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). Thus, in concluding that the prosecutor’s misstatements of the law during voir dire constituted harmless error, we held that there was no reasonable probability that these misstatements contributed to [the defendant’s] conviction. See id. Therefore, regardless of whether counsel was deficient for failing to object to improper statements by the prosecution, [the defendant] cannot demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.

Id. (citation omitted).

3.11 A lawyer must not prevent a deponent from answering questions unless a legal privilege applies. (See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(c)).

Professionalism Expectations

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“[Supreme Court] cases have uniformly recognized the public trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979). “The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); see also Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2174 (2014) (“The Sixth Amendment provides for twin engines of public accountability for the prosecution of crimes: the right to a jury trial and the right to public trial.”).

But the right to a public trial is not absolute. In some circumstances, it is not triggered at all. See United States v. Yumang, 164 F.4th 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2026) (“The brief courtroom closure [for five minutes] was too trivial to be a Sixth Amendment error at all, let alone a reversible plain error.”); Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (closure of twenty minutes did not implicate Sixth Amendment); United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–891 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying Peterson’s “triviality standard” to exclude the defendant’s 8-year-old son during trial); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2003) (satisfying the “widelyaccepted Peterson test” after public excluded during mid-trial questioning of jurors); Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 918–19 (7th Cir. 2000) (exclusion of a single excused juror during trial satisfied Peterson’s “triviality standard”); see also United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x. 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (Peterson’s “triviality analysis” remains valid after Presley). And in others, the right may yield to “a compelling governmental interest . . . [where courtroom closure] is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Clements v. State, 742 So. 2d 338, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). Put another way, “[t]he presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 502 (1984).

In the seminal case of Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established four prerequisites for courtroom closure: First, the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; second, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; third, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceedings; and fourth, the court must make findings adequate to support the closure. Pritchett v. State, 566 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984)).

Courts have resultingly routinely upheld partial courtroom closures during a minor victim’s testimony in sexual offense cases, provided family members and members of the press are authorized to remain in the courtroom. This is particularly true in cases involving familial abuse. See United States v. Galloway, 963 F.2d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming partial closure of courtroom during testimony of 18–year–old rape victim constitutionally permissible in view of victim’s age and nature of crimes where press along with the defendant’s family permitted to stay); Bell v. Jarvis, 7 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (upholding partial closure during testimony of twelve–year–old victim of sexual offenses where press and family of the victim were permitted to stay), rev’d, 198 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated on reh’g en banc, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Morgan v. Lane, 705 F. Supp. 410, 412–15 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (upholding partial closure during testimony of 16–year–old victim of rape, sexual assault, and incest trial where media and family could remain in the courtroom), aff’d, 897 F.2d 531 (7th Cir.1990); People v. Leggans, 625 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (partial closure upheld during testimony of eight-year-old sex offense victim where media and those directly involved in the case permitted to stay); State v. Fayerweather, 540 A.2d 353, 354 (R.I. 1988) (authorizing partial closure during testimony of sixyear-old molestation victim, where family and press remained).

But any such closure is not automatic. A case-by-case analysis as to the remaining prongs of Waller must be undertaken. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 168 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Globe, 457 U.S. at 609)).

Under the third prong of Waller, the court is compelled to consider reasonable alternatives if available, even when not offered by the parties. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (U.S. 2010). This prong has been the subject of some debate, as it appears to run counter to other entrenched appellate principles. See id. at 218 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even assuming the Court correctly extends Waller and Press-Enterprise I to this (Sixth Amendment voir dire) context, neither opinion ‘explicit[ly] places on trial courts the burden of sua sponte suggesting alternatives to closure ‘absent an opposing party’s proffer of some alternatives.’”); see also Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be preserved for further review by [an appellate] court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation . . . .”); Abrams v. Paul, 453 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla 1st DCA 1984) (“[I]t is the function of the appellate court to review errors allegedly committed by trial courts, not to entertain for the first time on appeal issues which the complaining party could have, and should have, but did not, present to the trial court.” (citing Palmer v. Thomas, 284 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); 3 Fla. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 92)); Garcia v. State, 401 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. App. 2013) (“[T]he trial court had to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure, sensibly reject each one, and issue specific findings that justified the closure in light of controlling law.”). Moreover, the lower court must render case-specific findings to enable meaningful appellate review. Presley, 558 U.S. at 215.