<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Seminole County Criminal Defense]]></title><description><![CDATA[Providing case law updates related to criminal defense.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:00:27 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://abaghdadi.substack.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[abaghdadi@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[abaghdadi@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[abaghdadi@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[abaghdadi@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[4 FACTORS IN DETERMINING DOUBLE JEOPARDY DISTINCT ACTS]]></title><description><![CDATA[There are four factors listed in to determine if there are distinct acts for purposes of double jeopardy.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/4-factors-in-determining-double-jeopardy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/4-factors-in-determining-double-jeopardy</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:44:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Smith v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla 3d DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Jacobs v. State, 272 So. 3d 838, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (&#8220;Pursuant to the distinct acts test, a single criminal impulse may be punished only once no matter how long the action may continue, while separate, successive impulses may be punished separately even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action. In determining whether acts are distinct, courts consider factors such as whether there was (1) a temporal break between the acts, (2) intervening acts, (3) a change in location between the acts; and/or (4) a new criminal intent formed.&#8221;) (citation omitted).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT IF DISBELIEVED CAN BE CONSIDERED EVIDENCE OF GUILT]]></title><description><![CDATA[If the defendant&#8217;s statement is not believed it can be considered as evidence of the defendant&#8217;s guilt.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/defendants-statement-if-disbelieved</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/defendants-statement-if-disbelieved</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 18:00:34 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>United States v. Sigmon, _ F.3d _ (11th Cir Nov. 2026)</h3><blockquote><p>It is well-established in this Circuit that &#8220;a statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant&#8217;s guilt.&#8221; Alejandro, 118 F.3d at 1521 (quoting United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995)). That rule has &#8220;&#8216;special force&#8217; where . . . highly subjective elements, such as intent, are to be proved.&#8221; Id. (quoting Brown, 53 F.3d at 315); see also United States v. Chalker, 966 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2020) (same).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[STATE COMMENT “NO LONGER PRESUMED INNOCENT” OKAY IN CONTEXT]]></title><description><![CDATA[The state&#8217;s comment that the defendant was no longer presumed innocent was meant to be taken in context about the what the evidence showed.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/state-comment-no-longer-presumed</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/state-comment-no-longer-presumed</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:51:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Holton v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 3rd DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Holton argues the State&#8217;s comments concerning his presumption of innocence were improper because the State did not link them to any specific evidence, but rather, just told the jurors not to afford him the presumption given it had presented evidence establishing he was the killer. Not so. </p><p>Read in context, the surrounding comments link the remark to &#8220;testimonial, physical, and circumstantial evidence&#8221; the jury had heard. Accordingly, the State&#8217;s comments do not constitute error because the comments were directly tied to the State&#8217;s perspective on the strength of the evidence. See Dessaure v. State, 55 So. 3d 478, 487 (Fla. 2010) (finding no error where State commented it &#8220;chipped and chipped away at that cloak [and] [defendant] no longer enjoys that presumption&#8221; because comments were tied to the State&#8217;s perspective on the strength of the evidence); see also Dailey v. State, 965 So. 2d 38, 44 (Fla. 2007) (&#8220;Regarding the prosecutor&#8217;s statements concerning [defendant&#8217;s] presumption of innocence, . . . when read in context, the comments appear to be a statement by the prosecutor of her belief that the State satisfied its burden of proof.&#8221;).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[WHEN THE COURT PARTICIPATES IN PLEA OFFER BUT IMPOSES HARDER SENTENCE AFTER TRIAL WITHOUT CAUSE ITS VINDICTIVE]]></title><description><![CDATA[When the trial judge participated in plea negotiation but imposed a harder sentence after trial without giving a reason for doing so it is considered to be vindictive.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/when-the-court-participates-in-plea</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/when-the-court-participates-in-plea</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:39:45 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Nobles v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 5th DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Nobles and the State both agree that the trial judge was an active participant in the change of plea hearing (to the point of making an offer for Nobles to accept) and that nothing explains why he dramatically increased her sentence (from the 36 months offered to the maximum of 60 imposed) other than Nobles&#8217;s exercise of her right to a hearing. As this Court explained in Pickard v. State, 417 So. 3d 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025):</p><p>&#8220;When a trial court imposes a harsher sentence after participating in plea negotiations, the appellate court must review the totality of the circumstances to determine if the sentence is vindictive.&#8221; Simplice [v. State], 134 So. 3d [555,] 556 [(Fla. 5th DCA 2014)]. These circumstances include: (1) whether the court initiated plea discussions with the defendant, (2) whether the court appears to have departed from its impartial role by urging the defendant to accept a plea or by implying that going to trial would influence sentencing, (3) the disparity between the plea offer and the sentence imposed, and (4) the lack of any facts to explain the increased sentence other than the defendant exercising his right to a trial or hearing. Id. at 556&#8211;57 (quoting Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142, 156 (Fla. 2003)).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[SPEEDY RUNS ON CHARGES FROM THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE]]></title><description><![CDATA[For speedy trial to run on an uncharged crime it must arise from the same criminal episode, and not just a related one.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/speedy-runs-on-charges-from-the-same</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/speedy-runs-on-charges-from-the-same</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:34:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>State v. Muhammad, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 2d DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Under rule 3.191(a), any person charged with a felony shall be brought to trial within 175 days of arrest. The speedy trial period begins when the defendant is taken into custody, which includes being "arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode that gave rise to the crime charged." See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (d). "Under certain limited circumstances, . . . the right to a speedy trial can commence to run on uncharged crimes if the uncharged crimes are part of the same 'criminal episode' as the charged crimes." Clevenger v. State, 967 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (quoting State v. Hanna, 858 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)); see also State v. Kelly, 407 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) ("We have previously held that for speedy trial purposes, even though the same conduct gives rise to separate offenses, both must be tried within the speedy trial time." (citing Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433, 434&#8211;35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), receded from by State ex rel. Canup v. Langston, 341 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977))).</p><p>"Crimes are deemed to be part of the same criminal episode so as to trigger the running of the speedy trial period when they are based on the same conduct, even though the conduct may give rise to different consequences." Clevenger, 967 So. 2d at 1041 (first citing Hanna, 858 So. 2d at 1250; then citing State v. Lynch, 445 So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); and then citing Shearin v. State, 755 So. 2d 800, 801&#8211;02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)); see also Kelly, 407 So. 2d at 259 ("[A] criminal episode requires that the same conduct or episode give rise to different consequences." (citing State v. Stanley, 399 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981))).</p><p>Notably, "[t]he definition of a criminal episode for speedy trial purposes involves a broader concept than the determination of what constitutes the same offense for double jeopardy purposes." Kelly, 407 So. 2d at 259 (first citing Bryant v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 847, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); and then citing State ex rel. Meyer v. Keough, 325 So. 2d 75, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)).</p><p>To be discharged under rule 3.191, "the defendant must show more than the mere fact that the evidence leading to the subsequent charge was first discovered as a result of the original arrest and charge for the initial offense." State v. Hoesley, 427 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). "[E]ven when the temporal separation is not significant, when different crimes are involved, they are not deemed a part of the same criminal episode unless they are based on substantially the same acts." Baynham, 72 So. 3d at 798 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hanna, 858 So. 2d at 1250). To qualify as the same criminal episode, "[t]he conduct needs to be more than 'merely related'&#8212;it should be 'the same conduct.' " Id. (quoting Walker v. State, 390 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)); see also, e.g., Carter v. State, 432 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (concluding that "the time in which the state was allowed to prosecute [the charge of causing a death by the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated] began to run when the appellant [was in custody and] pled guilty to the crime of driving while his license was suspended or revoked" because "[t]he appellant's conduct, i.e., driving the automobile, was the sole conduct which resulted in both criminal charges placed against him"); Robinson v. Lasher, 368 So. 2d 83, 83&#8211;84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (holding that under rule 3.191, the defendant was entitled to discharge for a manslaughter offense because the State "arrested and charged [the defendant] with reckless driving . . . as a result of an accident in which a passenger in [the defendant's] automobile was killed" but filed an information "charging the [defendant] with manslaughter as a result of the same incident giving rise to the previous arrest . . . 196 days after his initial arrest").</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[KNOWLEDGE OF PROCESS NOTIFYING DEFENDANT OF DL SUSPENSION WAS PC]]></title><description><![CDATA[The fact the officer knew the process of how a defendant gets notified that his license will be suspended for not paying child support constitutes probable cause for dwls.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/knowledge-of-process-notifying-defendant</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/knowledge-of-process-notifying-defendant</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 13:26:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Warren v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla 4th DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>&#8220;An arrest, because of its intrusive nature, must be predicated on probable cause.&#8221; Millets v. State, 660 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Probable cause to arrest exists &#8220;when the totality of the facts and circumstances within the officer&#8217;s knowledge would cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant is the one who committed it.&#8221; D.S. v. State, 122 So. 3d 482, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Stone v. State, 856 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (&#8220;Probable cause has been defined as where the facts and circumstances within an officer&#8217;s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed.&#8221;) (citation modified). At the time of the arrest, the officer need not possess all the proof necessary to establish guilt at trial, and the possibility of an innocent explanation does not itself defeat probable cause. State v. Blaylock, 76 So. 3d 13, 14&#8211;15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).</p></blockquote><p>Moreover, &#8220;[t]he question of probable cause is viewed from the perspective of a police officer with specialized training and takes into account the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act.&#8221; State v. J.J., 143 So. 3d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citation modified). In Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 445 (Fla. 1992), the supreme court explained that training and experience matter insofar as they provide a specific basis for reasonably concluding that a crime is being committed. Probable cause &#8220;is a low standard that does not require absolute certainty about criminal activity.&#8221; Gomez v. State, 155 So. 3d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citing Blaylock, 76 So. 3d at 15).</p><p>Here, the State met that burden on the probable cause issue. Before arresting Appellant, the detective had confirmed both the license suspension and Appellant&#8217;s identity as the suspended driver. The database consulted by the detective supplied more than an unexplained indication that the license was invalid&#8212;the database identified childsupport delinquency as the reason for the suspension, and showed that the suspension had begun approximately eight months earlier. The detective connected that information to a specific notification process which he knew from experience. He testified at the suppression hearing that notices from the child support office and the licensing agency precede a suspension for failure to pay child support.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[FRAME WORK FOR NEIL CHALLENGE]]></title><description><![CDATA[After the party making the Neil challenge satisfies the 3 step process the burden shift to the party using the peremptory strikes to give a race neutral reason for the strike.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/frame-work-for-neil-challenge</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/frame-work-for-neil-challenge</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 13:17:26 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Mesamours v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 3rd DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>After Batson, the Florida Supreme Court decided State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988). Slappy found that the test for evaluating peremptory challenges requires a &#8220;clear and reasonably specific&#8221; race-neutral explanation of &#8220;legitimate reasons.&#8221; Id. at 22 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96&#8211;98 &amp; n.20). It also endorsed five nonexhaustive factors that weigh against the legitimacy of a race-neutral explanation: &#8220;(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor&#8217;s reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror who were not challenged.&#8221; Id.</p><p>The following year, in Melbourne, the Florida Supreme Court reduced the Neil framework to a three-step procedure: </p><p>[1] A party objecting to the other side&#8217;s use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike. [2] If these initial requirements are met . . . the court must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike. </p><p>At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation . . . . [3] If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained . . . .</p><p>679 So. 2d at 764. &#8220;[T]hroughout this process,&#8221; the court emphasized, &#8220;the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.&#8221; Id. Melbourne also receded from Slappy&#8217;s requirement of a &#8220;reasonable&#8221; explanation in favor of a &#8220;genuine&#8221; one, while noting that &#8220;[r]easonableness is simply one factor that a court may consider in assessing genuineness.&#8221; Id. at 764 &amp; n.9.</p><p>[B]ecause genuineness turns on credibility, we defer to &#8220;the superior vantage point of the trial judge, who is present, can consider the demeanor of those involved, and can get a feel for what is going on in the jury selection process.&#8221; Files v. State, 613 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Fla. 1992);</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF ASKING TO REHEAR A MANDATE ON THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE]]></title><description><![CDATA[The defendant wanted a rehearing on whether the court violated the confrontation clause allowing a 911 call in where there was no longer a ongoing emergency]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/defendant-not-entitled-to-relief</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/defendant-not-entitled-to-relief</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 14:47:24 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Marshall v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 3rd DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Petitioner, Henry Bernard Marshall, an incarcerated prisoner serving a sentence for armed robbery, seeks a writ of habeas corpus. Distilled to its essence, his claim rests on the assertion that the affirmance of his direct appeal constitutes a manifest injustice. Marshall specifically contends that this court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by placing its imprimatur on the admission of a recording of the victim&#8217;s 911 call at trial because the recording contained testimonial statements and the victim was not subject to cross-examination.</p><p>Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the &#8220;admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross examination.&#8221; Id. 541 U.S. at 53&#8211;54. Davis held that &#8220;[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.&#8221; 547 U.S. at 822. In contrast, statements &#8220;are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.&#8221; Id. at 822.</p><p>As the Supreme Court observed in Davis, a 911 recording &#8220;is ordinarily not designed primarily to &#8216;establish or prove&#8217; some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.&#8221; Id. at 827 (citation modified). Even so, the conversation has the potential to &#8220;&#8216;evolve into testimonial statements&#8217; once that purpose has been achieved.&#8221; Id. at 828 (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005))</p><p>Marshall moved for rehearing en banc. This court denied his motion, but four judges dissented from the denial, questioning whether there was an ongoing emergency during the 911 call. Judge Cope specially concurred, noting that Marshall and his cohort &#8220;took the victim&#8217;s wallet, which had his address, and his house and car keys&#8221; and therefore &#8220;there was an ongoing risk that the perpetrators would go to the victim&#8217;s house and use the keys to gain entry, or return to hijack the car.&#8221; Id. at 476 (Cope, J., specially concurring).</p><p>A careful review of the petition and historical filings reveals that the keys were only retrieved after they were discarded by the perpetrators during fresh pursuit. The victim had not yet recovered his keys when he spoke with the 911 operator. And as Judge Cope cogently explained in his special concurrence, the victim&#8217;s wallet, which contained identification reflecting his home address, was also seized during the robbery. Marshall, 45 So. 3d at 476. These facts are sufficient to dispel the contention that there was no ongoing emergency.</p><p>Though sagacious minds may differ, and did indeed differ, as to the correct application of the law to the facts in the direct appeal, Marshall has failed to demonstrate that the panel&#8217;s affirmance of his conviction was infected by the type of egregious error that rises to the level of manifest injustice. Accordingly, we deny the petition.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[FAILURE TO DISCLOSE SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANT AGREEMENT UNTIL TRIAL IS A DISCOVERY VIOLATION]]></title><description><![CDATA[The State&#8217;s failure to disclose a substantial assistant agreement until mid-trial was a discovery violation. The fact the State just learned of it is irrelevant.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/failure-to-disclose-substantial-assistant</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/failure-to-disclose-substantial-assistant</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 14:37:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Sullivan v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 1st DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>The State&#8217;s failure to disclose the substantial assistance agreement until mid-trial was a discovery violation. The State must disclose &#8220;any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statement made by the defendant.&#8221; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(C). Here, there is no dispute about the statements by Sullivan accepting the officers&#8217; proposal to act as a confidential informant. That the prosecutor did not know of the statements until trial is irrelevant. Prosecutors are charged with constructive knowledge of information known by police officers. Gorham v. State, 597 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 1992).</p><p>The trial court was therefore required to conduct a Richardson inquiry. In making that inquiry, the trial court had to assess whether Sullivan was prejudiced by the alleged violation. Wilson v. State, 261 So. 3d 723, 725&#8211;26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). That assessment required the trial court to consider at least these three factors: (1) whether the violation was &#8220;inadvertent or [willful]&#8221;; (2) &#8220;whether the violation was trivial or substantial&#8221;; and, &#8220;most importantly,&#8221; (3) what effect the violation had on Sullivan&#8217;s ability to &#8220;properly prepare for trial.&#8221; Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 775.</p><p>When a trial court fails to conduct an adequate Richardson inquiry, the appellate court must apply the special harmless error test set out in State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1995), to determine whether the discovery violation was harmless. Under that test, the appellate court can find harmless a trial court&#8217;s failure to conduct an adequate Richardson inquiry &#8220;only if [it] can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation.&#8221; 653 So. 2d at 1021. &#8220;[T]he defense is procedurally prejudiced if there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant&#8217;s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred.&#8221; Id. at 1020.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[BRADY EXTENDS TO IMPEACHMENT]]></title><description><![CDATA[Brady evidence extends to impeachment.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/brady-extends-to-impeachment</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/brady-extends-to-impeachment</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 14:30:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Jones v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>We have said that, to establish that the State has violated its Brady obligation, &#8220;the defendant has the burden to show that: (1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.&#8221; Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803, 827 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 400 (Fla. 2017)). &#8220;When a Brady violation occurs, a defendant is entitled to a new trial.&#8221; Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2018).</p><p>&#8220;In reviewing a Brady claim, &#8216;this Court defers to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of those facts to the law.&#8217; &#8221; Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d 1002, 1028 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Lightbourne v. State, 841 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 2003)).</p><p>Here, the State knew that FDLE analysts had concluded that Bello&#8217;s DNA found on Perez&#8217;s penis was &#8220;highly unlikely&#8221; to have been the result of secondary DNA transfer and was rather &#8220;more than likely a direct contact of some sort.&#8221; The State violated the Brady rule when it withheld this evidence, as it would have provided a substantial basis for impeachment of the State&#8217;s witnesses, and Jones was prejudiced by his not having received it.</p><p>The State&#8217;s duty under Brady &#8220;extends to impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.&#8221; Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869 (2006). Accordingly, the first component of a Brady violation is satisfied where the evidence in question is &#8220;favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.&#8221; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.</p><p>The second component of a Brady violation is the State&#8217;s willful or inadvertent suppression of evidence. Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 827. Generally, there is no Brady violation &#8220;where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.&#8221; Provenzano v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993). A trial court&#8217;s finding as to whether the State disclosed Brady material is a factual finding that will be upheld as long as it is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 911 (Fla. 2000).</p><p>Finally, Jones must demonstrate that the suppressed evidence was material. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-82. &#8220;To establish materiality or prejudice under Brady, the defendant &#8216;must demonstrate . . . a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial.&#8217; &#8221; Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 827 (omission in original) (quoting Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006)).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[DETECTIVE WAS NOT AN EXPERT AND DID NOT CONSIDER RELEVANT FACTS IN DETERMINING SPEED]]></title><description><![CDATA[Detective Moss was not a accident reconstruction expert, did not have the knowledge to determine speed, nor did he consider the appropriate factors to use.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/detective-was-not-an-expert-and-did</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/detective-was-not-an-expert-and-did</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:12:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Faustin v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 4th DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>The trial court ruled that Detective Wiley could opine on the vehicles&#8217; speeds, as he was merely testifying about his investigation. But Wiley did more than that. He opined as to the vehicles&#8217; speeds based on a formula which he apparently learned during his training. This is not permissible lay opinion testimony. See Fino v. Nodine, 646 So. 2d 746, 748-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (&#8220;[o]pinion testimony of a lay witness is only permitted if it is based on what the witness has personally perceived,&#8221; and &#8220;typically involves matters such as distance, time, size, weight, form and identity&#8221;); &#167; 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2024) (providing that a lay witness may give opinion testimony when &#8220;[t]he opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training&#8221;). </p><p>Section 90.702 governs expert opinion testimony: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: </p><p>(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;</p><p>(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and </p><p>(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.</p><p>Instead, the trial court treated Detective Wiley&#8217;s speed calculation as part of his investigative testimony. Because Wiley&#8217;s calculation depended on specialized knowledge and methodology, it constituted expert opinion testimony subject to section 90.702.</p><p>Even assuming that momentum analysis may constitute a reliable methodology when properly performed, the state did not establish that Detective Wiley&#8217;s opinion rested on sufficient case-specific facts or data or that he reliably applied the methodology to the facts of this collision. Wiley used vehicle weights derived from averages found through internet searches, without accounting for weight differences between trim levels and vehicle styles. He calculated departure angles using Google Maps and a protractor, although he acknowledged that departure angles used in the momentum formula must be &#8220;very accurate.&#8221; He also assumed that the Corolla&#8217;s approach angle was zero because &#8220;[t]hat is how we are taught to do it when we use this formula.&#8221; Moreover, he could no longer produce the field sketch documenting how he arrived at his calculations.</p><p>The defense expert, Aaron Moss, an accredited accident reconstructionist trained in analyzing event data recorders, explained why these deficiencies mattered. Moss testified that Detective Wiley&#8217;s unscaled field sketch was insufficient to calculate speed. Moss also disputed Wiley&#8217;s assumption that the Corolla was traveling straight at impact, explaining that the video was too unclear to support that assumption and the event data recorder indicated otherwise. Finally, Moss testified that he had never encountered the use of averaged vehicle weights obtained through internet searches for a momentum calculation. According to Moss, Wiley also used the wrong trim level for the Corolla, which affected its weight&#8212; an important variable in the formula.</p></blockquote><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[KEY TO SAFE DOESN’T ESTABLISH POSSESSION]]></title><description><![CDATA[The court stated that holding a key to a safe is not sufficient to prove knowledge and/or control in a possession case, where the contraband was in the safe.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/key-to-safe-doesnt-establish-possession</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/key-to-safe-doesnt-establish-possession</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 13:53:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Oliver v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 5th DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Oliver&#8217;s possession of a key to the Molten Avenue house does not establish constructive possession of the safe that had been inside the house. The house belonged to a third party. The State presented no evidence that Oliver owned, resided in, or otherwise exercised control over the house. Because the house was not in Oliver&#8217;s exclusive possession, the State could not rely on the safe&#8217;s location within the residence to infer Oliver&#8217;s knowledge of, or control over, the contraband inside the safe. See Stevens v. State, 120 So. 3d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (stating a defendant&#8217;s possession of a key providing access to the premises where contraband was located was insufficient, without more, to establish constructive possession, since a &#8220;next-door neighbor, a housekeeper, or a landlord&#8221; might likewise hold a key to the premises without committing any crime). Independent proof is required.</p><p>The same is true of the safe key. Having failed to establish that Oliver had exclusive possession of the house, the State likewise could not rest on his possession of the safe key to show that he knew of or controlled what the safe contained. Again, independent proof was required. No evidence, including fingerprints, DNA, or otherwise, was provided to show that Oliver handled, possessed, or controlled the safe or the contents inside. A key affording access, without more, establishes only opportunity, not possession. See id. (&#8220;[T]he fact that one has &#8216;access&#8217; to contraband or, as in this case, merely to the place where the contraband is located, is simply not a crime, or even an element of a crime, under the law of Florida.&#8221;).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[NON-STATUTORY DOWNWARD DEPARTURE INVALID WHEN GROUNDS ALREADY ADDRESSED BY LAW OR UNRELATED TO CHARGE]]></title><description><![CDATA[The trial court can not downward depart when an the reason for the departure is already addressed by statute or it is not related to the case.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/non-statutory-downward-departure</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/non-statutory-downward-departure</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 13:45:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>State v. Mathis, _ So.3d _ (Fla 2d DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>As "the first purpose of sentencing is to punish," legislative sentencing policy discourages downward departures absent mitigating factors that concern "the nature of the crime, the conduct of the defendant or the mental capacity, condition, or attitude of the defendant," primarily vis-&#224;-vis the offense conduct. State v. Chestnut, 718 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing &#167; 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat.); see also &#167; 921.0026(2). "Generally, mitigating circumstances supporting a downward departure ameliorate the level of the defendant's culpability." Rafferty v. State, 799 So. 2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing State v. D'Alexander, 496 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)).</p><p>Atwaters v. State, 519 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 1988) ("[S]ince the legislature has used the quantity of drugs involved in the offense as a basis for establishing varying penalties, it is clearly not consistent with the purpose of the guidelines to also use the quantity of drugs as a reason for departure.").</p><p>We are constrained to conclude that the trial court's additional and alternative bases for departure fare no better. Mathis's volunteer work while incarcerated and awaiting trial, although undeniably laudable, does not relate to the nature of the crime itself or to Mathis's offense conduct or level of culpability; consequently, a departure on that basis does not appear to be consistent with legislative sentencing policy. And, like the Third District in Paulk, 813 So. 2d at 154 n.1, we could find no "case law that suggests that good work in the community is a valid basis for departure.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[COURT CAN’T CONSIDER DISMISSED ALLEGATIONS]]></title><description><![CDATA[It was fundamental error for the court to consider dismissed allegation of violation of probation when considering the defendant a danger.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/court-cant-consider-dismissed-allegations</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/court-cant-consider-dismissed-allegations</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:48:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Mc Taw v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 3rd DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>&#8220;Fundamental error occurs where a trial court considers constitutionally impermissible factors when imposing a sentence.&#8221; Ramirez v. State, 420 So. 3d 570, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (quoting Yisrael v. State, 65 So. 3d 1177, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)). &#8220;Although it is permissible for the trial court to consider the circumstances surrounding the primary offense and the defendant&#8217;s prior record, consideration of subsequent misconduct or pending or dismissed charges is constitutionally impermissible and violates a defendant&#8217;s due process rights.&#8221; Nichols v. State, 283 So. 3d 947, 950 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). Here, the record reflects the trial court improperly considered the two withdrawn affidavits of violation when it made its dangerousness finding and sentenced Mc Taw. The trial court relied on the withdrawn affidavits to conclude that Mc Taw was a danger to the public and &#8220;not amenable to non-incarceration sanctions.&#8221;</p><p>Therefore, we reverse Mc Taw&#8217;s sentence and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See Chang v. State, 423 So. 3d 437, 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (&#8220;Where it is clear that the State directed a trial court&#8217;s attention to uncharged misconduct . . . and it is likewise clear that the trial court relied on such information, this court must reverse and remand for resentencing before a different judge.&#8221; (quoting Alhasani v. State, 397 So. 3d 814, 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024))).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[4 FACTORS TO CONSIDER ON VINDICTIVE SENTENCING]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Florida Supreme Court has laid out 4 factors to consider when determining whether a sentence is vindictive.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/4-factors-to-consider-on-vindictive</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/4-factors-to-consider-on-vindictive</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:40:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Chinchar v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 1st DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>A vindictive sentence is 2 one that was &#8220;imposed in retaliation for the defendant not pleading guilty and instead exercising his or her right to proceed to trial.&#8221; Id. at 733 (quoting Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142, 156 (Fla. 2003)).</p><p>The Florida Supreme Court has laid out four factors that an appellate court should consider in determining whether a presumption that a sentence is vindictive exists: (1) whether the trial court initiated the plea discussions; (2) whether the trial court, through its comments on the record, appears to have departed from its role as an impartial arbiter by urging the defendant to accept a plea or by indicating that the sentence imposed would hinge on whether the defendant accepted a plea; (3) the disparity between the plea offer and the ultimate sentence imposed; and (4) the lack of any record facts that explain the reason for the increased sentence other than that the defendant exercised her right to a trial or hearing. See Wilson, 845 So. 2d at 156. Once a presumption of judicial vindictiveness has been established, the burden shifts to the State to produce &#8220;affirmative evidence on the record to dispel the presumption.&#8221; Id.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[LANGUAGE OF ORDER MUST BE CLEAR AND ONE COURT CANNOT HOLD CONTEMPT OF ANOTHER’S COURT’S ORDER]]></title><description><![CDATA[In the current case the language of the order had to be clear for contempt, and one court cannot hold someone in contempt of another court&#8217;s order.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/language-of-order-must-be-clear-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/language-of-order-must-be-clear-and</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:33:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A.C. v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 5th DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>&#8220;For a person to be held in contempt of a court order, the language of the order must be clear and precise, and the behavior of the person must clearly violate the order.&#8221; Paul v. Johnson, 604 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Additionally, and pertinent here, &#8220;[a]s a general rule, the power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned, and one court cannot punish a contempt against another court.&#8221; Guntner v. Jennings, 980 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (alteration in original) (first quoting Graham v. State, 144 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); and then citing 17 C.J.S. Contempt &#167; 69 (2002) (&#8220;The court which renders the order . . . is alone vested with the right to determine, on a rule for contempt for failure to comply with the order, whether the order has been complied with or a sufficient reason given for failure to comply therewith.&#8221;)).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[ALLEGED GENERALIZE SUSPICOUS ACTIVITY WASN’T CORROBATED TO DETAIN DEFENDANT]]></title><description><![CDATA[The defendant was illegally seized when he was stopped based on generalized suspicious activity that was not sufficiently corroborated.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/alleged-generalize-suspicous-activity</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/alleged-generalize-suspicous-activity</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 12:56:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Holliday v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 5th DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Law enforcement promptly responded to what dispatch had described as a burglary in progress&#8230; Three or four law enforcement officers &#8220;circled&#8221; Holliday and asked him what he was doing&#8230; The officers told Holliday that they were investigating a burglary, that he matched the description in the dispatch, and&#8212;importantly&#8212;that he was not free to leave.</p><p>In August 2023, an apartment dweller called 911 just before 5:00 a.m. to report that someone had attempted to turn the knob on her apartment door. She described him as a black male with dreads, wearing a black t-shirt and red pants.1 During the 911 call, she told the dispatcher that she was currently viewing him through her Ring doorbell camera and that he was &#8220;still trying to get in.&#8221;</p><p>This case is akin to R.E. v. State, 536 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), which likewise involved a citizen informant phoning the police to report a suspected drug transaction between the occupants of two cars. A police officer later stopped one of the vehicles the caller identified &#8220;on the basis of the message he had received,&#8221; even though &#8220;there was nothing to arouse suspicion and the driver was obeying the traffic laws.&#8221; Id. at 1126&#8722;27. The First District held that the police improperly stopped the car, writing that:</p><p><strong>[T]he instant case involves a citizen&#8217;s claim of suspicious activity that has a minimal objective basis and, except for innocent details of identification, is uncorroborated by law enforcement&#8217;s subsequent observations. Corroboration of nothing more than innocent details of identification (e.g., a license plate number) assists the state in making the required showing that the information was sufficiently detailed to single out the suspect. It does not, however, create or support a suspicion that crime is afoot, which is essential if a report of generalized, allegedly suspicious activity is to justify a stop. The absence of this suspicion is fatal to the state&#8217;s position and the trial court&#8217;s ruling.</strong></p><p>Here, the officers had no more than the apartment caller&#8217;s uncorroborated claim of &#8220;generalized, allegedly suspicious activity&#8221; when they seized Holliday and told him he was not free to leave. At most, the officers had corroborated only the innocent descriptive details of Holliday&#8217;s identification, which falls short of what is legally required to seize and detain an individual.</p><p>In conclusion, the officers in this case corroborated nothing more than the innocent details of identification that matched Holliday&#8217;s appearance (other than the two snakes, which the caller did not mention). The officers were entitled to attempt to question Holliday, but not to detain or physically seize him. Absent corroborating evidence of criminality, the caller&#8217;s information amounted to a &#8220;mere hunch,&#8221; which is not sufficient to justify even a brief detention. Fields, 292 So. 3d at 895. Because the &#8220;trial court erred when it failed to grant a judgment of acquittal on the charge[s] of resisting without violence,&#8221; Holliday&#8217;s convictions for those charges are reversed and, on remand, Holliday is entitled to the entry of a judgment of acquittal. Espiet v. State, 797 So. 2d 598, 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (&#8220;Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the State failed to present competent sufficient evidence that the officers were engaged in the lawful performance of their duties.&#8221;).</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[PTSD ADMISSIBLE BUT LIMITED TO SHOW SELF DEFENSE ONLY BY AN EXPERT]]></title><description><![CDATA[In a self defense case PTSD is admissible by expert testimony. But the expert is prohibited from testifying about certain areas.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/ptsd-admissible-but-limited-to-show</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/ptsd-admissible-but-limited-to-show</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:34:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Bedward v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 4th DCA 2026)</h3><blockquote><p>The primary purpose of an autopsy is to shed light on the cause of the victim&#8217;s death, an issue not present in this case because Fonte admitted to stabbing the victim. While the toxicology report may have contravened the statement Fonte gave to the police, its primary purpose was not to advance Fonte&#8217;s criminal prosecution. Therefore, it was not testimonial in nature.</p><p>However, our supreme court made clear that PTSD evidence could not be used to support an otherwise inadmissible claim of diminished capacity. Id. at 477. Importantly, the Florida Supreme Court specifically commented that the trial court could prevent the risk of PTSD evidence being used improperly by giving a limiting jury instruction, and then they pointed out three of the five conditions which the trial court had imposed in Mizell for the admission of PTSD evidence in that case:</p><p>The trial court in Mizell, for example, set forth in its pretrial order five specific conditions that had to be met in order for the defense to introduce the PTSD evidence, including the defendant himself testifying and laying a predicate, the expert witness being allowed only to lay out the defendant&#8217;s background but not vouch for it, and the expert witness being prohibited from offering an opinion on the validity of the defendant&#8217;s self-defense claim. Id. at 477-78.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[AUTOPSY REPORT DOESN’T INVOKE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE]]></title><description><![CDATA[An autopsy that had to be done pursuant to Florida Statute did not invoke the confrontation clause. It was done pursuant to Florida Statute, and prosecution wasn&#8217;t the primary purpose.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/autopsy-report-doesnt-invoke-confrontation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/autopsy-report-doesnt-invoke-confrontation</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:11:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Fonte v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 3d DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>Smith addressed whether a substitute witness may testify at trial about a forensic report prepared by a non-testifying analyst as support for the testifying witness&#8217;s own independent opinion. Id. at 783. Smith recognized that, to implicate the Confrontation Clause, the out-of-court statement must be both (i) hearsay introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and (ii) testimonial in nature. Id. at 800.</p><p>A Confrontation Clause violation did not occur in this case because the routine toxicology report &#8211; about which the chief medical examiner testified&#8211; was prepared as part of the autopsy&#8217;s standard protocol, and the autopsy was performed as part of the chief medical examiner&#8217;s statutory duty, a duty that arises when a person dies of criminal violence. See &#167; 406.11(1)(a)1. &amp; (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020).</p><p>In Banmah v. State, 87 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), this Court ruled that a substitute witness could introduce an autopsy report prepared by a medical examiner without violating the Confrontation Clause because the autopsy report was not testimonial. Id. at 103; but see Rosario v. State, 175 So. 3d 843, 857 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). </p><p>The primary purpose of an autopsy is to shed light on the cause of the victim&#8217;s death, an issue not present in this case because Fonte admitted to stabbing the victim. While the toxicology report may have contravened the statement Fonte gave to the police, its primary purpose was not to advance Fonte&#8217;s criminal prosecution. Therefore, it was not testimonial in nature.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[LEO DOESN’T HAVE TO JUSTITY ORDERING OCCUPANTS OUT OF CAR]]></title><description><![CDATA[LEO doesn&#8217;t have to justify the safety concerns to order the occupants out of the vehicle during a traffic stop. In this case the officer was doing a canine smell of the car.]]></description><link>https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/leo-doesnt-have-to-justity-ordering</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://abaghdadi.substack.com/p/leo-doesnt-have-to-justity-ordering</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Baghdadi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:04:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fu9A!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99f2e291-80c0-4e0a-8c41-f1041ebe047d_616x616.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Parish v. State, _ So.3d _ (Fla. 1st DCA 2026):</h3><blockquote><p>A law enforcement officer does not need a special reason or an additional particularized basis to order a person to exit his vehicle. See generally id. at 491&#8211;95. Rather, without more, &#8220;an officer making a traffic stop may order [people] to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.&#8221; Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). This is permitted because approaching a person seated inside a vehicle during a traffic stop is dangerous enough that a law enforcement officer always has a &#8220;safety reason&#8221; to order the person to exit. See Creller, 386 So. 3d at 492 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109&#8211;11 (1977)). In other words, the &#8220;for officer safety reasons&#8221; is not a condition that the State needs to prove in every case. Rather, it is the justification for the straightforward rule that a law enforcement officer may order a person out of a car during a traffic stop. The exit order in this case was, therefore, lawful.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>